Abstract. Traditional real-time control systems are tightly integrated into the industrial processes they govern. Now, however, there is increasing interest in networked control systems. These provide greater flexibility and cost savings by allowing real-time controllers to interact with industrial processes over existing communications networks. New data packet queuing protocols are currently being developed to enable precise real-time control over a network with variable propagation delays. We show how one such protocol was formally modelled using timed automata, and how model checking was used to reveal subtle aspects of the control system's dynamic behaviour.
Introduction
Process controllers for automated industrial plants must sample data from sensors, calculate appropriate responses, and send signals to actuators, all within strict timing bounds. The computations performed by such controllers implicitly rely on the assumptions that sensor data is received, and the controller software is invoked, periodically with very little 'jitter' (timing variability). Traditional control theory [4] assumes that the controller and the industrial process it governs are co-located, allowing communication between the sensors, controller and actuators to be treated as instantaneous. Now, however, there is increasing interest in the greater flexibility and cost savings made possible by distributing the system's components, with the computer-based controller connected to the physical sensor and actuator devices via a standard communications network [12] . In practice, doing this introduces two significant problems. Firstly, transmission of data between the controller and the devices may suffer variable propagation delays. This can affect the accuracy of timing-dependent calculations in the control software. Secondly, communication over the network may be unreliable. Occasional data packet 'dropouts' can leave the controller with little or no information on which to base its control decisions. Both problems can significantly degrade the controller's performance [11] .
As part of a project developing real-time protocols for networked control systems we needed to evaluate data packet queuing mechanisms intended to compensate for the effects of network-induced delays and data packet dropouts. In previous work we successfully analysed the timing characteristics of one such protocol using a network simulator [14, 13] , but these performance profiles did not tell us how the proposed protocol affects the functionality of the whole system.
In this paper we explain how we used a real-time model checker to evaluate the behaviour of a proposed control algorithm for networked systems. To do this we constructed a simple finite-state model of the control system and a discrete approximation of its physical environment. The resulting model proved to be a highly effective and efficient way of discovering potential system behaviours. In particular, it quickly revealed situations in which the controller can become unstable.
Previous Work
Our goal in this research was to use model checking to analyse the functional behaviour of a networked control system. In this section we briefly review some relevant prior work on model checking and analysis of real-time control systems.
Model checking [6] involves constructing a model of a system from one or more finite state automata and then exploring the model's reachable states. Each automaton in the model consists of a number of locations and transitions between them. Transitions are guarded by predicates which determine when they may fire, and assignments to variables may be performed during the transition from one state to the next. Automata are nondeterministic when more than one transition is ready to fire at the same time.
Model checkers analyse such a model by exploring its state space, looking for particular states, or state sequences, of interest. The user usually describes states of interest using temporal logic formulae. The model checker then performs proofs by refutationit searches for a counterexample to a claimed property [9] . Since it is impractical to exhaustively explore models with large state spaces, much of the research in model checking has been on ways of optimising this process. Even so, users of model checkers are obliged to ensure that their model captures the essential properties of the system of interest, but without producing a state space that is too large to analyse.
Since we were concerned with real-time systems we decided to use the UPPAAL model checker [3] , which is based on timed automata theory. It extends traditional state-machine notations with time-valued 'clock' variables. All clocks progress synchronously, which allows implicit synchronisation between automata. Explicit synchronisation is supported via shared 'channels'. UPPAAL has been optimised for analysis of time-dependent systems through the use of continuous intervals for modelling clocks, rather than discrete 'ticks' [2] . The UPPAAL toolkit has been used to analyse many realtime systems [10] , including proposed real-time protocols for wireless networks [15] , although not the kind of networked control system we consider here.
Analysis of real-time control systems is, of course, a well-explored topic. 'Hybrid' approaches are often used to account for the fact that a digital controller's behaviour is discrete, whereas its physical environment is continuous. Recently, for instance, Dubey et al. described a toolkit for analysis of real-time control systems [7] . They distinguish 'symbolic' analysis approaches, which construct executable models for directly simulating continuous behaviours, from 'reductionist' methods, which produce a discretized approximation to the continuous behaviour. Their ReachLab toolkit takes the former approach whereas, as explained below, we adopt the latter model. In their conclusion, Dubey et al. note that modelling 'networked hybrid automata' is an area for future work in their system [7] . Rather than attempting to devise an entirely new hybrid approach for networked control systems, we show below that a carefully constructed discrete model is sufficient to produce useful experimental results.
With respect to analysis of networked control systems, Martí et al. discuss the effects of network-induced timing delays on real-time controllers [11] . They stress the importance of integrating the controller model with that of the physical environment when analysing such systems. Their studies showed how network delays can create instability in the control system's responses. As shown in Section 4 below, our model confirms these findings.
Most recently, Andersson et al. used their TrueTime network simulator to analyse the behaviour of wireless networked control systems communicating with a continuous environment [1] . In our own work, we have similarly profiled the performance of a proposed networked control system protocol using the NS2 simulator [14, 13] . However, our interest in this paper is in automatic exploration of all possible states through model checking, rather than examining individual traces using simulation.
In this paper we combine the lessons learned from all of this previous work. Mindful of the requirements of networked control system analysis [11] , and informed by previous models of real-time systems [1, 8, 7] , we develop a simple model that allows efficient and accurate exploration of possible networked control system behaviours using an off-the-shelf model checker.
Modelling a Networked Control System
In this section we explain how we modelled a proposed real-time queuing protocol for a networked control system as a set of timed automata. UPPAAL's timed-automata syntax is introduced as needed. Firstly, we briefly describe the proposed protocol (Section 3.1). The model then comprises three parts: a simple abstraction of the network's ability to deliver packets in time (Section 3.2); the components of the real-time controller itself (Section 3.3); and a discrete approximation of the physical environment (Section 3.4).
A Proposed Real-Time Queuing Protocol
In a previous paper [14] we outlined a simple queuing protocol for a 'smart' process controller which communicates with an industrial processing plant via an unreliable communications network with significant propagation delays. The controller receives sensor readings as data packets sent over the network and calculates responses to be sent to an actuator. As usual in such systems we assume that the controller's software is implemented as a simple computational 'task', or 'process', which is invoked at fixed intervals. The start of each such period is called the task invocation's 'arrival' time.
To allow for the possibility that a data packet arrives earlier than expected, the controller has a buffer, sample, which stores each data packet received until needed. (This could be implemented in latching hardware or using a software interrupt handler.) To allow for the possibility that a data packet arrives too late or not at all, the controller also has a queue, previous, which holds several previous data packets. These can be used to calculate responses when packets 'drop out'. Typically queue previous would hold at least three previous data values, to allow meaningful extrapolations to be calculated. The way in which this queue is updated and used depends on the particular control algorithm.
The controller performs various actions within fixed intervals relative to the arrival (starting) time of each period. These intervals are bounded by four constants.
1. Earliest is the earliest time at which a data packet sent from the sensor to the controller could possibly arrive. 2. Latest is the latest time at which a data packet is expected. Packets arriving after this time are ignored. 3. Compute is the time at which the controller will start using the received data packets to compute an output to send to the actuator. 4. Deadline is the time by which the controller must send its response to the actuator.
These constants are related as follows.
Our previous work on performance profiling of the protocol considered how to calibrate these constants [14, 13] , but did not analyse the system's overall functionality.
Finite State Model of the Communications Network
To formally analyse such a system our aim was to model its essential features without introducing irrelevant detail that would create a state-space 'explosion' during model checking. Although we could have modelled the passage of data packets from the sensor to the controller in detail, the only aspect of the network's behaviour that actually concerns us is whether or not packets arrive in time.
Therefore, our models of different network behaviours were simple state machines which indicate the status of each data packet. One such model is shown in Fig. 1 . This particular model was one of several constructed to describe different network behaviours. Others included a relatively uncongested network in which each tardy packet is separated from the next by at least two punctual packets. The simplest model was of a totally reliable network which delivers all packets on time.
The particular automaton in Fig. 1 uses synchronisation channels OnTime and TooLate to say whether or not the packet for the current period arrived in time, respectively. The '!' decorations mean that these are 'output' synchronisations [3] . The corresponding inputs can be seen in Fig. 2 . The finite state machine in Fig. 1 comprises three locations, denoted by circles, and several transitions, indicated by arrows [3] . Distinguished location NetworkOK, marked by a double circle, is the initial one in which the model begins. Transitions are annotated with the synchronisation events that allow them to fire. Since this (untimed) automaton is fully synchronised with the timed automaton in Fig. 2 , there is no need for any explicit timing constraints in Fig. 1 .
The particular network model in Fig. 1 represents a heavily congested network in which two consecutive data packets may arrive late. If the network is in location NetworkOK, a packet can be delivered late, leaving the network in location Congested. A second packet can then be delivered late, leaving the network in location StillCongested. After this, however, the next packet must arrive on time. The other network models used during the experiments made different assumptions about the separation between packet 'dropout' events and the number of consecutive dropouts allowed.
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Timed Automata Model of the Real-Time Control System
As explained in Section 3.1, there are two consecutive phases of the controller's operation in each period: queuing received data packets and computing values to send to the actuator based on the available data. We chose to model these two phases as two distinct timed automata (Figs. 2 and 3 ), since this allowed us to experiment with different combinations of queuing protocols and response calculations.
Correct interleaving of the transitions performed by the two automata is guaranteed by the timing constraints on their transitions. Each automaton maintains its own clock variable, time, and uses this to determine when to perform transitions. Thanks to UP-PAAL's synchronous time model there was no need to explicitly synchronise the two automata. However, the two automata share global state variables sample and previous. Fig. 2 shows the automaton that models how the controller queues data packets. It has a single location QueuesReady and two transitions, both of which are synchronised with those of the network model in Fig. 1 . The uppermost transition may occur when the network model says that a data packet arrives on time and the lower transition may occur when the packet arrives too late. Time-valued variable arrival is used to determine the time at which transitions may fire.
In UPPAAL's semantics time progresses while automata are in locations; transitions are instantaneous. Locations can be annotated with predicates which must be true for the automaton to remain in the location. Transitions may be guarded by predicates which must be true for the transition to fire, and may perform assignments to state and clock variables. Here we write guarded assignments as 'guard → assignments' and individual assignments as 'variable := expression'.
In Fig. 2 location QueuesReady is accompanied by an invariant which says that the automaton may stay in this location no later than the arrival time of the current period, represented by variable arrival, plus constant Latest. Both transitions are guarded by a predicate that says that they may fire no earlier than the arrival time of the period plus constant Earliest. In effect, the invariant combined with the guards ensures that the transitions fire between Earliest and Latest seconds from the arrival time of the period. When they fire, both transitions add constant Period, the separation between task invocations, to the arrival time in readiness for the next task invocation.
Importantly, the automaton in Fig. 2 models the way the data packet queues in the networked controller are updated [14] . If the data packet arrives on time the sampled sensor reading, flow (see Section 3.4), is both stored in buffer sample and inserted onto the front of queue previous. If the data packet arrives too late the only action is to store the special constant NoPacket in buffer sample.
The timed automaton which models the way the controller calculates responses for the actuator, shown in Fig. 3 , uses its own local time and arrival variables to model its periodic invocation. In this case the invariants associated with the locations and the guards attached to transitions ensure that the automaton leaves location AwaitingData exactly Compute seconds after the arrival time of the period, and leaves location PreparingOutput at Deadline seconds after arrival.
When in location AwaitingData there are two transitions the controller can take, depending on whether or not a data packet was successfully received in this period, as indicated by the absence or presence of constant NoPacket in buffer sample. The specific assignments performed depend on which type of controller algorithm we are modelling, as discussed in Section 4. In general, though, if no packet has arrived (rightmost transition in Fig. 3) , we need to update buffer sample and queue previous with some default or calculated value. If a data packet has arrived (middle transition in Fig. 3 ) no special action is required because we can use the value placed in variable sample by the queuing automaton in Fig. 2 . In both transitions we may calculate an error value, for use when computing a response when packets are dropped, as discussed in Section 4. When the automaton leaves location PreparingOutput it means that the calculation is complete and the value in buffer sample can be sent to the actuator (leftmost transition in Fig. 3 ). The arrival time is then set to the beginning of the next period.
Timed Automaton Model of the Physical Environment
To demonstrate the actual behaviour of a given controller algorithm we need to put it in the context of its anticipated physical environment. Consider a controller for a chemical processing plant which is required to monitor the flow of liquid through a pipe. A flow meter embedded within the pipe measures the (instantaneous) rate of flow of liquid through the pipe and this data is sent periodically to the controller, via a network. The controller uses the flow readings received to generate a suitable output to an actuator or display device.
When modelling such an environment we must devise a discrete approximation of its continuous dynamic properties. Brinksma and Mader, in their own work on model checking a chemical plant controller, noted the difficulty of devising a suitable discretization of the plant's continuous behaviour [5] . Based on our previous experience in modelling control systems and their environments [8] , we resolved to develop a model which allowed us to precisely control the range, velocity and acceleration of the observed physical property.
As shown in Fig. 4 , the model's main purpose is to update variable flow, which represents the rate at which liquid is currently flowing through the pipe, measured in litres per second. (Global variable flow is read by the controller model in Fig. 2 .) Clock variable delay is used to determine when this variable is updated. samples sensor readings periodically, it is sufficient to update flow at the same rate. Thus, each location in Fig. 4 has an invariant which says that the automaton may remain in the location for no longer than the period, and each transition is guarded by a condition that allows it to fire no later than the period's duration since the last transition. When each transition occurs, the delay variable is reset to zero. In effect, transitions in Fig. 4 fire exactly every Period seconds. Bounding the range of the observed flow of liquid was achieved easily by ensuring that variable flow does not go outside an interval defined by constants MinFlow and MaxFlow each time it is updated.
To ensure that the flow rate changes smoothly, the model consists of a sequence of locations, each of which represents the situation in which the flow of liquid through the pipe is increasing or decreasing at a particular rate. The model begins in location ConstantFlow. While in this location, variable flow remains unchanged. However, if the automaton moves to location SlowIncrease the rate of flow is increased by constant SlowChange in each period. From here it can move to location MediumIncrease (not shown) which results in variable flow increasing by a larger constant in each period, and so on. Conversely, if the automaton moves from location ConstantFlow to location SlowDecrease the flow rate decreases in each period. Thus, the model cannot jump directly from a low rate of increase to a high one or vice versa-it must progress through a series of intermediate stages. In total there were seven such locations in the particular model used for the experiments shown in Section 4.
Strictly speaking, the separate locations in Fig. 4 could be collapsed into a single one, by adding an additional state variable that represents the current rate of increase. However, having separate locations made simulation traces displayed with UPPAAL's graphical user interface much easier to understand because the user could follow the progression of the rate of flow through the different locations.
As well as the strict sequence of locations which governs acceleration, counter variable inertia was used to limit the speed with which the automaton can move from one location to the next. As its name suggests, this variable models resistance to change in the flow rate of liquid through the pipe, i.e., the liquid's inherent sluggishness. For instance, if the model is in location SlowIncrease then variable inertia is incremented at each transition. Guards on the outgoing transitions then ensure that the automaton can leave this location only if inertia equals or exceeds constant MinSlowChange, thus forcing the rate of increase to remain the same for a minimum number of periods. Adjusting constants MinSlowChange, MinMediumChange, etc, gave us precise control over the rate of changes to observed variable flow.
The final feature of the environment model is constant Rebound which appears in guards on transitions leading to the two locations at the extreme ends of the sequence, MaximumIncrease and MaximumDecrease. This constant is used to prevent the automaton from entering or staying in a location modelling a high rate of change when the flow rate is near the limits of its range. In effect, the Rebound constant models the 'pushback' caused by turbulence when the pipe is nearing its capacity and the residual trickle of liquid when the pipe is emptying. This feature was not part of our original model, but we introduced it to exclude unrealistic behaviours in which the liquid was seen to approach its maximum and minimum flow rate at impossibly high accelerations. 
Experimental Results
Our goal in this research was to develop a model for assessing the effectiveness of proposed controller algorithms (Figs. 2 and 3) given particular behaviours of the physical environment (Fig. 4) and of the network connecting the two (Fig. 1) . In this section we describe the results of a variety of experiments conducted with the model in Section 3.3 using UPPAAL's simulator and model checker. For ease of comparison between the controller's inputs and outputs, we assume here that our controller is merely required to forward sampled flow measurements to a display device. More generally, though, the controller's output would be some function of its inputs. As a benchmark, we began with the simplest possible form of controller, one which merely reuses the last value seen when a sensor reading fails to arrive in time. In the rightmost transition in Fig. 3 this means that buffer sample is assigned the value at the head of queue previous, i.e.,
where index zero accesses the first item the queue. (The error variable is not used yet.)
A typical simulation in this situation is shown in Fig 5, assuming a controller running at a frequency of 5 hertz, and a maximum rate of flow through the pipe of 15 litres per second. In the particular trace shown the measured flow of liquid begins at zero litres per second, quickly approaches the maximum capacity of the pipe, and then begins to decrease. The networked control system attempts to mirror this behaviour but cannot due to packet dropouts that occur in the periods beginning at times 1.0, 1.2, 1.8, 2.4, 2.6, 3.4 and 3.6 seconds after the start of the simulation. This causes the actuator's output to be lower than the actual flow when the rate is increasing and to exceed the true flow when the rate is decreasing, as we would expect.
To compensate for the effects of packet dropouts, we then developed a model of a controller which calculates a new value to replace a dropped one by extrapolating from the most recent values seen. In Fig. 3 the update to buffer sample in this case is
In other words, this 'extrapolating' controller adds the difference between the last two sensor readings displayed to the most recently displayed value when a sample is not received.
To confirm the effectiveness of this control strategy we then simulated the revised system's behaviour as shown in Fig. 6 . As hoped, the extrapolating controller's output is a much closer fit to the desired behaviour than that of the simple controller. It successfully compensates for dropped data packets except in situations where two successive packets are dropped while the rate of flow is changing.
Although this single simulation would seem to suggest that the extrapolating controller is adequate for our needs, the true advantage of using a model checking tool such as UPPAAL is that we can ask it to automatically explore a wide range of possible behaviours. Therefore, we asserted (using an appropriate temporal logic expression) that the controller's output will always stay within 4 litres per second of the actual flow of liquid and challenged the model checker to find a counterexample. Fig. 7 shows the result.
Here the model checker has found a particular network behaviour that causes the controller's output to become unstable. Even though there are no long sequences of consecutive packet dropouts, the counterexample reveals that a particular pattern of dropped packets can cause the extrapolating controller to successively overestimate and underestimate the flow values. Even worse, it can be made to do so with a cumulative error. Thus a dropped packet at time 1.2 caused the controller to underestimate the flow by one litre per second (extrapolating from the samples at times 0.8 and 1.0). The next packet dropout, at time 1.6, caused the controller to overestimate the value by 2 litres per second (extrapolating from the estimated value at time 1.2 and the sampled value at time 1.4), and so on. With hindsight, it is apparent that the extraordinary controller behaviour in Fig. 7 is due to the presence of estimated values in queue previous. Each time a packet is dropped, an estimated replacement value is produced. This value is placed in queue previous in lieu of the missing packet (rightmost transition in Fig. 3) , and can thus lead to a cumulative error in the next such calculation. Indeed, this kind of instability is well known in control theory, confirming the accuracy of our model.
Next we resolved to define a more sophisticated form of controller, to overcome the undesirable effects just seen. The new controller 'adapts' its behaviour by calculating the error between its own estimates and actual samples received. This error measurement is then used to adjust the extrapolated values when packets are dropped.
In the middle transition in Fig. 3 , which models the controller's actions when a data packet has been successfully received, the error value is calculated as follows.
Here term 'previous[1]+(previous [1] −previous [2] )' is an extrapolation from previouslydisplayed values and 'sample' is the actual value received. The error is thus the difference between the two.
For the rightmost transition in Fig. 3 , which models the controller's actions when a data packet is dropped, the calculations of the replacement sample value and the error are as follows. The controller's output value is calculated by extrapolating from the previously-displayed values, as before, but corrected by a proportion of the error found in the preceding extrapolation. Through experimentation we found that using one half of the error value worked well. The error value for the next period is set to zero in this case since there is no actual sample to compare with the extrapolation. To confirm that this control strategy has the desired effect we then simulated the 'adaptive' controller in the same situation that caused the unstable behaviour using a simple extrapolation. As shown in Fig. 8 the results were encouraging. The adaptive controller successfully avoided the cumulative oscillations that occurred previously.
As a final check, however, we once again challenged the model checker to find a counterexample to our assertion that the controller's output always stays close to the sampled input values. As shown in Fig. 9 , the model checker responded with a remarkable counterexample where a particular pattern of dropped packets again causes the controller's output to oscillate with cumulative error around the desired values. Unlike  Fig. 7 , however, this behaviour could not be produced by isolated dropouts, but only by having sequences of two successive dropped packets, combined with a particular pattern of variations in the flow rate.
Once again the root cause of the problem is the presence of estimated, rather than actual, values in queue previous. To create instability in the adaptive controller, however, it proved necessary for the queue to contain at least two estimated values, in effect meaning that the majority of the values used to perform calculations were estimates. Thus, although the adaptive controller was shown to be more robust than the extrapolating one, it was still found to be vulnerable to certain extreme environmental behaviours.
Although obvious with hindsight, this result surprised us at first since it revealed that the relatively sophisticated 'adaptive' controller can have worse behaviour than the 'simple' one we began with. In Fig. 5 the simple controller performs comparatively well when the network drops sequences of packets, even when the rate of increase is steep, whereas Fig. 9 shows that the adaptive controller can become unstable even when the flow is increasing slowly overall.
Of course, a network that is dropping as many packets as shown in Fig. 9 would not be used in practice as a basis on which to make critical control calculations. Normally a separate fail-safe mechanism in the overall system design would shut the plant down or set it to some neutral state if the network was seen to be behaving like this. 
Conclusion
Networked control systems are an emerging and increasingly important technology for governing industrial processes. Given that many such systems are safety-critical, it is important that their dynamic behaviours can be predicted before they are deployed. Model checking offers the ability to automatically explore a system's state space, potentially revealing extreme behaviours that could be overlooked during manually-guided simulations.
We have shown how we used model checking to explore the behaviour of a proposed 'smart' controller for networked control systems. This was done by modelling significant characteristics of the controller, network and physical environment. The network and controller models were fairly simple, although linked rather intricately by shared variables, channels and timing characteristics, while the environment model was comparatively large, due to the need to approximate a continuous behaviour, but had a simple regular structure. The UPPAAL model checker proved highly effective and efficient at finding undesirable system behaviours. All of the model checking results presented above were produced in a few minutes of processor time.
The approach can be adapted easily to analysis of other time-dependent systems. At the time of writing we are working on a model which will allow two different versions of a periodic software task to be directly compared by simulating both versions simultaneously within the same environment. This will be used to determine if a newlydeveloped controller is an adequate replacement for a legacy one.
